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toward new partnerships, especially with
Southeast Asia and Japan. While promising, they face the significant challenge of
what Baruah diplomatically calls India’s
“history of working in isolation” (p. 172).
If, as one Australian scholar asserts, “the
great game in the Indian Ocean is still
in its early phases,” it will be increasingly important for the United States to
understand the Indian Ocean region and
its residents (p. 232). Students and specialists will find India and China at Sea a
succinct and well-crafted overview of the
disparate voices influencing maritime
competition in this vital ocean region.
DALE C. RIELAGE

To Master the Boundless Sea: The U.S. Navy, the
Marine Environment, and the Cartography of
Empire, by Jason W. Smith. Chapel Hill: Univ.
of North Carolina Press, 2018. 280 pages. $35.

Scholars long have understood the
power of the map. In To Master the
Boundless Sea Jason W. Smith explains
and explores the power of the nautical
chart, masterfully weaving his observations into the history of the U.S. Navy.
It is an exceptional work, strong in its
scholarship, and boasting a compelling—at times lyrical—narrative.
Smith’s book follows a chronological
approach, culminating in the years
following the Spanish-American
War—the presumed height of the
American empire; more-modern
hydrographic activities are mentioned
only in passing. Major themes include
the interrelationship between commerce and the Navy, bureaucratic
rivalries within the Navy and with
other government agencies, the
linkages between hydrography and U.S.
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imperialism, and the evolution of the
nautical chart into a weapon of war.
To some degree, hydrography would
seem to be—and is—a natural adjunct
to the naval service. No environment is
more dangerous to mariners than coastal
and shallow waters; accurate charts are
a necessity to avoid deadly groundings.
Shallow-water craft, whether engaged
in smuggling or combat operations,
if provided with accurate depth and
current information, can bedevil larger
foes who lack that local knowledge.
A chart—an accurate one—makes
this knowledge exportable. However,
such knowledge does not come easily; Smith details the painstaking and
backbreaking repetitive work, usually
conducted by sailors and junior officers,
needed to gather these data. This
was work for engineers, not poets.
However, as Smith notes, hydrography—
as part of the larger science of oceanography—always has involved more than
engineering. At least in its early stages,
understanding the coastlines of distant
shores also involved understanding
the nature of the peoples who lived on
those shores. This required abilities and
skills associated with anthropologists;
linguists; and, when these meetings
became confrontations, military officers.
The dangers of early hydrographic work
were considerable, sometimes deadly.
Smith also highlights tensions
between naval hydrographers and
the wider community of scientists.
Naval officers were then and are now
essentially pragmatists. They do not lack
for curiosity or imagination, but they
energize those traits for the attainment
of a practical objective, such as a
knowledge of safe passages or the best
sailing directions. While a generalization, it can be asserted that mariners,
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less concerned with knowledge for its
own sake—and at times more roughhewn than their academic counterparts—were not always welcomed
by pure academics, and vice versa.

of U.S. hydrographers in accurately
charting these waters is nowhere more
apparent than in a comparison of prewar
charts of Guantánamo Bay with those
created after the American victory.

Smith details how a powerful connection between the Navy’s ever-increasing
knowledge of the maritime environment
and seagoing commerce was forged
and strengthened from the beginning.
Time (and safety) was money to
merchant captains and the owners for
whom they worked. Matthew Fontaine
Maury’s wind and current charts cut
days or weeks from sailing times, and
time saved was money earned. One
of the book’s illustrations—a whaling
chart produced by the Navy and used
extensively by the captains of Herman
Melville’s era—speaks to the cooperation
between the commercial and military
spheres. And whaling was not the only
industry to have such close ties to the
Navy; as underwater cables began to
knit together continents and colonies,
the requirement to map the topography
of the deep ocean floor became
more significant as the mechanisms
to achieve this goal advanced.

To Master the Boundless Sea also
acknowledges the Naval War College’s
role in the development of naval
hydrography and the evolution of the
nautical chart into not only an aid
to war but also a critical component
of campaign and battle planning. Of
particular note was the work of Captain
William McCarty Little in bringing war
gaming to Newport. Whereas Mahan
articulated a strategic vision, McCarty
Little’s wargaming charts mapped ways
of making that vision a strategic reality.

As steam supplanted sail and Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s strategic insights grew
to dominate naval thinking, charts became essential enablers of U.S. imperial
ambitions. Using the Spanish-American
War as a backdrop, Smith demonstrates
how charts became tools of conquest.
Spanish charts of Cuba, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines were incomplete,
and without accurate hydrographic
information American naval commanders’ difficulties increased. After
victory in the Spanish-American War,
accurate charts were vital in selecting
the locations of future naval installations
and coaling stations. The diligence
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Smith fills a major niche in understanding the role of nautical charts, the people
and organizations that created them,
and how they all advanced scientific
understanding and a larger American
identity. To Master the Boundless Sea
is a superb work that will reward the
interested and discerning reader.
RICHARD J. NORTON

The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the
Transformation of the Cold War, by Michael
Cotey Morgan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ.
Press, 2018. 424 pages. $35.

One of the bigger questions in history—
right up there with why did the Roman
Empire fall—is why did the Cold War
end. This question becomes even more
significant when one remembers that
the United States and its allies defeated
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
without a direct, military confrontation.
Other long-term strategic confrontations
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